A ? 2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer protocol is a way for a party Rachel to get one bit from a pair b 0 ; b 1 that another party Sam o ers her. The di culty is that Sam should not nd out which secret Rachel is getting while Rachel should not be able to get partial information about more than one of the bits. This paper shows a way to make "veri able" this protocol (v-? 2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer ) and shows that it can be used to directly achieve oblivious circuit evaluation Ki] and fair exchange of bits MRL], assuming the existence of a non-veri able version of the protocol.
Introduction
The study of disclosure protocols has greatly evolved recently. Oblivious transfer has now been used for quite a while as a standard primitive tool for construction of cryptographic protocols Ra] Bl]. The importance and extreme generality of this protocol was evidenced by the work of BCR2], Cr] and Ki] who basically showed that every two-party protocol can be achieved using only oblivious transfer as a primitive. The results of BCR2] and Cr] are that a very general disclosure problem (all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)) can be solved through a set of reductions from an oblivious transfer protocol. Kilian showed how to use the ANDOS primitive to implement the very general oblivious circuit evaluation (OCE) protocol.
In some sense this result is not very surprising. The earlier work of GMW] and CDG] hinted that any two party protocols could be achieved given a 2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer protocol. The only missing piece at the time was the fact that these protocols relied not only on {Oblivious Bit Transfer get generally confused in a setting with computational assumption, since commitments are used extensively in order to achieve 2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer . The result of Ki] is a rather complex construction that achieves OCE through a brand new machinery and solves the problem from scratch. The current paper presents an easy way to extend any ANDOS protocol to a v-2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer protocol, thus giving an alternate construction for the general OCE protocol.
Commitment Scheme
A Commitment Scheme is a way for Sam to commit himself to values that Rachel cannot determine but that are uniquely de ned. We call a blob the piece of data used by Sam to commit to a value. By opening a blob we mean to reveal the value represented by the blob in a veri able way. We assume that the reader is familiar with this notion and that he knows the properties of such objects BCC]. Although Sam cannot nd out which string Rachel is getting he may nevertheless use some \garbage" secrets that are of no use to her. Because of this possibility, if the outcome of the protocol must be used by Rachel in some further interaction, Sam may, by o ering \good" and \bad" secrets, determine from which set she chooses, depending on her ability to continue the protocol or not. In general, it might be necessary for Rachel to verify some properties of the secrets before getting one of them.
A Veri able ANDOS (VANDOS) protocol is a way for Sam to commit to a set of n strings of length t such that Rachel can open exactly one set of blob corresponding to one of his strings. Sam should not learn which string Rachel is getting and Rachel should not learn information about more than one string. It is necessary also that Rachel is convinced that if she had chosen a di erent secret she would have been able to open it correctly as well (this is the veri ability property).
VANDOS can be achieved from v- To open the blob Sam must reveal each and every l i ; r i . To be satis ed, Rachel should check that each pair XORes to the same bit (l i r i = b) and that each of the bits she got in the rst place (c i ) is correct.
One can easily verify that Rachel has no way to cheat, while Sam can cheat only with probability 2 ?s (corresponding to the event that he guesses Rachel's choices).
Notice that it is also possible to create XOR-blobs for the same amount of work: blobs for which the XOR relation (c = b a) can be proven without revealing their values. To do so, we need only to create all these blobs at once. Let a; b and c be three bits. Sam can commit to these three bits in a way that he can convince Rachel that c = b a. Suppose that Sam chooses 6s random bits A 1 ; :::; A s , 1 ; :::; s , B 1 ; :::; B s , 1 ; :::; s , C 1 ; :::; C s , 1 ; :::; s such that A i i = a, B i i = b and C i i = c for all 1 i s. In order to commit to a; b; c Sam (using ANDOS) discloses to Rachel one triple out of (A i ; B i ; C What is wrong with this protocol? The problem with it is that there is no validation performed on the ANDOS used for the n-tuples. Sam could have some \good" n-tuple that really open the corresponding blob and some \bad" ones that don't. This way Rachel would be able to open or not the blob depending on her choice. Which is a potential threat in a setting where the result must be used in some further interaction. Indeed Rachel could complain about the fact that Sam gave her \garbage" matrices, but this would reveal him something about which secret she was after. The main idea of the solution is to make sure that Rachel can complain without revealing which secret she wants. 
What about Rachel?
Now, we also want Rachel to be committed to her choice c and what she reads b c . For that purpose, consider the above described protocol. Because it guaranties security from Rachel's point of view, we call it a R-v-2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer . We use this protocol as a primitive to build the v- Through this trick Sam increases his con dence that the committed value of c is likely to correspond to the value of r c obtained by the protocol. Unfortunately this protocol gives little guarantee that the committed value of r c corresponds to the value actually obtained. We solve this problem by repeating the above protocol s times with independent values of random bits (r More details and a proof of correctness of this protocol will be provided in the nal version of this paper. 7 using v-2 1 {Oblivious Bit Transfer to achieve OCE Basically, we use the technique of GV]; their result is based on a speci c cryptographic assumption, but can be extended easily to any v- using the XOR-property of the blobs. Rachel gets one of the bits (b) at random and gains this way a little bias toward the answer. To give this bias back to Sam she tells him the XOR of her result b with b 1 (and proves it using the XOR-property of the blobs).
